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Introduction
Officially opened in the early 1990s, China's stock exchanges were established as an experiment in combining a market economy with central planning. As most listed Chinese companies are sponsored and controlled by government-related entities, governmental intervention in the stock market has dominated throughout. The quotas of IPOs distributed across the nation are allocated by a local government to firms selected from its jurisdiction.
The local government deems the listed firms within its jurisdiction a symbol of wealth and prestige as well as a potent tool to promote territorial economic growth (Chan, Lin, & Mo, 2006) . While local firms finance investments and business expansion through equity offerings, more foreign capital resources would be absorbed to the municipal jurisdictions for local businesses, thereby stimulating economic development in the territory. However, the regulations require firms to attain a minimum rate of return on equity (ROE) to be qualified for rights offerings. Furthermore, investors tend to rely on earnings more than any other summary measures of firm performance to make their investment decisions (Biddle, Seow, & Siegel, 1995; Francis, Schipper, & Vincent, 2003; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2002) . Therefore, to facilitate financing, both the local governments and their listed firms aim for a high level of corporate reported earnings prior to equity offerings.
On the one hand, local governments compete to lend fiscal support (i.e., preferential tax treatment and financial subsidy) to local firms in support of their financing (Chen & Lee, 2001 ), thus inducing drastic competition for capital resources among the local governments. 1 On the other hand, firms that desire low financing costs tend to manipulate earnings to a high level.
This paper aims to investigate whether and how fiscal support in the form of preferential tax treatment and financial subsidy affects a firm's earnings management behaviors in China.
My investigation is motivated by the growing interests in the influence of political forces on firm activities in a transitional economy such as China (e.g., Gul, 2006; Leuz & Oberholzer, 2007; Piotroski, Wong, & Zhang, 2015; Hung, Wong, & Zhang, 2012) . Fiscal support from local governments is one source of political force that prevails in the transitional economy yet has remained unexplored by researchers. This study fills this void in the literature. Given the privatization through sales of government-owned enterprises and the increased opportunities for global investors (especially those from Europe and the United States) to purchase shares in China's stock market, understanding the role of fiscal support in a firm's financial reporting incentive is important to the market participants.
2 This practical implication can be generalized to other institutional settings where there are varied fiscal policies implemented across jurisdictions within a country (e.g., the United States) or across different countries within a politico-economic union (e.g., the European Union).
Both earnings management and fiscal support could help a firm achieve its desired earnings targets. However, earnings inflated by a firm would reverse and decline in the subsequent periods, which induces high risks of subsequent detection and hence reputational loss along with litigation and regulatory actions to a firm (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2008; He, 2015) . Hence, earnings management is a very risky and costly tool for a firm to boost its reported earnings. In contrast, while substituting for earnings management in propping up earnings numbers, fiscal support brings about real cash benefits for a firm. Thus, given a firm's desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support reduces the firm's demand for earnings management. Accordingly, I hypothesize that firms that receive stronger fiscal support from local governments have a lower level of earnings management.
Equity offerings in China provide an ideal setting to test this hypothesis. The reasons are two-fold. First, the hypothesis is based on the premise that managers have a desire to achieve certain earnings targets. Chinese equity issuers generally target a particular high level of reported earnings that appeal to investors so that they can manage to raise full capital as planned (Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000) . Second, local governments in China tend to fiscally support local firms for their financing such that more capital resources and foreign investments would be attracted to their jurisdictions. As a result, Chinese firms, to a varied extent, enjoy fiscal support from local governments during equity offerings.
Using data for Chinese firms that conducted IPO (initial public offerings) and SEO (seasoned equity offerings), I find strong evidence in support of the hypothesis. In particular, I find that firms have a smaller magnitude of earnings management prior to equity offerings if they enjoy more financial subsidies or more income tax savings attributed to income tax preferences granted by local governments. I also find that income tax preference mitigates a firm's earnings management to a larger extent than financial subsidy does. Prior research (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Haw, Qi, Wu, & Wu, 2005; Liu & Lu, 2007) documents that listed Chinese companies mainly use accruals to manipulate earnings.
Hence, I use abnormal accruals as the proxy for earnings management, which is estimated based on the modified Jones model. The results are robust to using other discretionary accrual models such as the one developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2006 Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Gul, 2006; Leuz & Oberholzer, 2007; Piotroski et al., 2015; Hung et al., 2012) .
Second, Chen, Lee, & Li (2008) find that local governments offer financial subsidies to help their local firms achieve their earnings targets for rights offerings, and they compare the subsidy grants to a sort of "real earnings management" directed by local governments. But Chen et al. (2008) do not investigate how the governmental subsidy affects managerial incentives and firm-level activities. This is the focus of my study. I account for a broader range of fiscal support including income tax preference and explore whether the fiscal support affects the firm-level earnings management behaviors.
To the extent that fiscal support is a sort of government-directed "real earnings management," this study contributes to the recent strand of earnings management literature (e.g., Cohen, Dey, & Lyz, 2008; Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, & McInnis, 2009; Jian & Wong, 2010; Zang, 2012; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Gunny, 2010; Burnett, Cripe, Martin, & McAllister, 2012; Chan, Chen, Chen & Yu, 2015) , which documents a substitutive relationship between real and accrual-based earnings management for achieving earnings targets. In essence, these recent studies show that each of the real and accrual-based earnings management activities decreases with its own costs and increases with the costs of the other. Different from the firm-level real earnings management that has suboptimal business outcomes or negative economic consequences for a firm, government-directed "earnings management," the fiscal support I focus on in this study, has positive real cash benefits for a firm. Hence, given a desired level of reported earnings to achieve, fiscal support is a robust substitutive mechanism for firm-level earnings management.
Third, there is growing evidence that government intervention and political forces shape financial reporting incentives of firms. For instance, Bushman et al. (2004) and Leuz and Oberholzer (2007) document that firms facing increased government intervention have an incentive to reduce financial reporting transparency and tilt the reported valuation to minimize the political costs. The political costs include an increase in tax burdens as well as a host of indirect taxes, such as tightened regulation or threat of greater government intervention into a firm's business activities. Piotroski et al. (2015) provide evidence that firms are inclined to suppress negative financial information in view of the expected political costs from the governments. This strand of literature focuses on the expected political costs associated with the given financial outcome of a firm to investigate the issue of how a firm's financial reporting practice is shaped by government intervention. In contrast, my study sheds light on this issue from a new perspective, that is, the benefits rather than the costs of political forces to a firm, and sees how a firm's financial reporting incentives are affected by fiscal support from local governments.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background. Section 3 develops the research hypothesis. Section 4 presents the research design. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
Institutional background

China's tax regimes and fiscal support from local governments
In China, the central government implements a planned quota system for IPOs, under 6 which a limited listing quota is assigned to the planning commission at the provincial level, and then the local governments make the allocation to IPO candidates within their administrative region. The limited share quota assigned to each firm is usually too small to meet its capital need (Chen & Yuan, 2004 Most listed companies in China were subject to the standard tax rate of 30% plus the local tax of 3% prior to their listing on the stock exchange. Those companies would no sooner be listed than receive approval from local governments to enjoy a preferential income tax rate.
The ensuing lower tax burden results in a higher level of reported earnings for the companies, thereby facilitating their financing through the subsequent equity offerings. The 30% standard tax rate could be reduced to 27%, 15%, or even 0% as a tax preference for firms. The specific amount of the 3% local tax to be levied from firms was arbitrarily up to the discretion of local governments. The local governments were prone to waive the 3% local tax to support local firms in their financing and investments. As such, the effective tax rates for most listed
Chinese companies fell in the following three intervals: 15%-18%, 24%-27%, and 30%-33%, with some of the firms enjoying an income tax exemption.
Before 2002, local governments could first levy income tax on companies at a rate of 33% and then refund part of the tax to the companies. Which company would be "qualified"
for the refund and how much of the refund would be paid were up to the discretion of local governments (Wu, Wang, Lin, Li, & Chen, 2007) . When a local government found it hard to get a favorable ground to grant preferential income tax rate to a firm, they used to resort to this "first tax last refund" practice to relieve the tax burden on their listed companies. Local governments that wished to attract foreign investments in local business usually offered large tax refunds to local companies right before the IPO to facilitate their financing (Chen & Lee, 2001 ).
Financial subsidy is another instrument for a local government to lend support to firms within its jurisdiction. Subsidies from local governments can be exempt from income tax, subject to approval from the Chinese central government. Local Chinese bureaucrats generally expect firms located in their jurisdictions to produce strong performance results since the provincial leaders' promotions and demotions are significantly associated with the economic performance of the province under their control (Li, 1998; Li & Zhou, 2005; Piotroski et al., 2015) . Since local enterprises make up the main forces of promoting the territorial economy, subsidy grants to enterprises prevail in China. 3 In order to attract economic resources and promote territorial economic growth, local governments compete to grant financial subsidies to their local enterprises in support of their financing. Chen et al. (2008) show that local Chinese governments tend to use subsidies to help firms boost their reported earnings to meet the regulatory return on equity (ROE) threshold for rights offerings.
Without the subsidies, which are being recognized as revenue in the income statements, a number of listed Chinese firms would have failed to meet the regulatory ROE requirement for rights issues (Chen & Lee, 2001 ).
In China, under the State Council regulations governing the tax revenue sharing regime, enterprise income tax levied by the local SAT offices is shared between central government and local governments in the ratio of 60% to 40% (Liu, 2006) . As 60 percent of the income tax levied on companies is assigned as fiscal revenues to the central government, local governments would only suffer 40% loss in fiscal revenues for offering income tax preferences to their local firms. Likewise, local governments also only suffer partial loss of fiscal revenues for granting "first tax last refund" to the local firms. Compared to the tax preference grant, a financial subsidy grant is more costly for a local government as the full amount of subsidies granted to firms is borne by the local government. So the income tax preference grant becomes a more common avenue for a local government to fiscally support its local firms than the financial subsidy grant. This helps explain why in China, enterprises that enjoy income tax preferences from local governments are far more abundant than enterprises that enjoy financial subsidies (Chen & Lee, 2001 ). 
Earnings management by Chinese companies
Prior empirical evidence indicates that investors rely on earnings more than any other measures of firm performance to assess firm value (Biddle et al., 1995; Liu et al., 2002; Francis et al., 2003) . Survey results also indicate that managers view earnings as the key metric for performance evaluation by investors and analysts (Graham et al., 2005) . Thus, in order to sell the shares at a higher price and raise capital at a lower cost, U. S. firms tend to manipulate earnings prior to equity offerings (e.g., Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998a , 1998b .
This motivation behind the earnings management in U. S. firms also applies to Chinese firms that plan on equity offerings (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007) . However, the motives for earnings management of Chinese firms differ from those of U. S. firms in two aspects.
First, unlike the agency conflict between shareholders and managers that explains earnings management in most of the U. S. companies, agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders accounts for a significant portion of earnings management for Chinese companies (Liu & Lu, 2007) . In China, controlling shareholders tend to plunder the wealth of minority shareholders or that of prospective outside investors Second, unlike listed U. S. companies, listed Chinese companies must meet certain financial performance criteria to be qualified for seasoned equity offerings. From 1996 to 1998, one of the basic requirements from China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereafter, CSRC) was that companies had to have a minimum of 10% ROE for the three consecutive years prior to rights offerings (CSRC, 1996) . In 1999, the rule was modified to require an average ROE of at least 10% as well as a minimum of 6% in each of the three years prior to the offerings (CSRC, 1999) . 
Hypothesis development
Prior research (e.g., Shivakumar, 2000) shows that financing at a low cost is one of the major motives for earnings manipulation. However, investors place less value on the earnings that are suspected of manipulation by a firm. Companies identified as earnings manipulators will be subject to a substantial increase in their costs of capital. Shivakumar (2000) provides evidence that investors rationally infer earnings management at the offerings announcements and correct the price accordingly. Haw et al. (2005) find that in China, investors are able to see through the managed earnings and to rationally adjust it in their investment decisions during rights offerings. DeFond and Park (2001) focus on the general setting and provide evidence that market participants could anticipate the reversal implication of abnormal accruals. Thus, once a firm's earnings management is undone by outside investors at equity offering announcements, the firm might either fail to raise full capital as planned or be subject to price discount by external investors early around the equity offering dates.
Even if, using earnings manipulation, a firm might manage to deceive the outside stakeholders at the offering announcements, the firm would still bear high risks of subsequent detection. Earnings management is just like borrowing future earnings for current use and thus would reverse and decline in the subsequent periods. Prior studies (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a Teoh et al., , 1998c provide evidence that earnings management prior to equity offerings is responsible for poor earnings performance after the offerings. This earnings reversal leads outside investors to suspect that earnings have been managed upwards before the equity offerings (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2008) . Accordingly, investors adjust for their earlier mispricing and further impose a price discount on firms for their earnings manipulation.
Consistent with this notion, prior research (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a) documents that pre-offerings earnings management explains the long-term stock underperformance after equity offerings. The subsequent detection of earnings management results in reputational loss for a firm and hence increases its costs of capital and impairs its capability to raise future financing (He, 2015) .
Earnings management also increases a firm's litigation risks. (2005) provide evidence that firms that are subject to CSRC enforcement actions experience a drastic decline in stock price, a greater rate of auditor change, a much higher incidence of qualified audit opinions, increased CEO turnover, and wider bid-ask spreads.
In sum, earnings management is a risky and costly instrument for a firm to boost its reported earnings. In contrast, fiscal support per se not only is costless for a firm but also increases the firm's real cash flows. Recent literature (e.g., Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015) documents that firms tend to use multiple earnings management tools as substitutes to achieve their desired earnings targets. These studies show that when discretion is more (less) costly for one earnings management tool, firms will make more (less) use of others. In a similar vein, while substituting for earnings management to boost the reported earnings, fiscal support adds real cash benefits to a firm. As such, given a firm's desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support should reduce the firm's demand for earnings management. This argument is in line with the incentive theory (e.g., Kerr, 1995) , which contends that one would be less likely to commit malpractice to reap its private benefits if it is given an economic incentive. Fiscal support is one such incentive that reduces the likelihood that firms venture upon earnings manipulation to achieve their earnings targets.
The discussion above leads to the hypothesis formulated in an alternative form as follows. 
H1:
where TAi,t is total accruals for firm i in fiscal year t; 8 REVi,t is change in revenues for firm i in fiscal year t; Ai,t-1 is total assets for firm i at the end of fiscal year t-1; RECi,t is change in accounts receivable for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. The model assumes that no systematic earnings management occurs for the cross-sectional estimation sample. So I exclude the IPO and SEO firm-year observations when using model (1) to do the crosssectional parameter estimates. The parameter estimation incorporates a constant term, 0, since doing so mitigates the model misspecification problem (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005) . Abnormal accruals (DA) for firm i in fiscal year t are measured by the residual value 6 I focus on the three-year pre-offerings period for my sampling because firms that conduct equity offerings are required to publicly disclose their financial performance for the most recent three years prior to the offerings. 7 I use the industry classification provided by CSRC, which classifies firms into 13 major industries such as manufacturing, real estate, commercial, etc. 8 For post-1998 data, TA is computed as the difference between operating net income and operating cash flows. For other years when cash flow statement data are not available, I compute TA as: (change in current assets -change in cash -change in short-term lending) -(change in current liabilities -change in shortterm borrowings -change in accrued income taxes -change in current portion of long-term debts) -depreciation expense -amortization expense, where the change is computed between year t and t-1.
from the model.
There has been growing evidence (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015) of how firms manage earnings through real activities manipulation in addition to the accruals-based method. For instance, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) abnormal production costs. In results not reported, however, I do not find significant positive abnormal production costs, negative abnormal discretionary expenses, nor negative abnormal cash flows from operations prior to equity offerings. This suggests that equity issuers in China do not engage in real earnings management that is more costly for a firm than accruals-based earnings management. Though real earnings management is less likely to be scrutinized and detected by outsiders (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010) , the Chinese issuers still rely primarily on the accruals-based method, probably in the belief that they could still fool some less-sophisticated investors who are not capable of undoing the accruals manipulation. A statistically significant variance of real earnings management (relative to 0) for the sample is requisite for the empirical analysis of the substitutive relationship between real earnings management and fiscal support. Hence, I do not account for real earnings management in this study.
Fiscal support variables
Fiscal support from local governments includes preferential income tax rate, income tax refund, and financial subsidy. Companies with a preferential income tax rate have reduced income tax expense. So I estimate a firm's income tax savings attributed to preferential income tax rate as the difference between the standard income tax expense (i.e., 33% of pre-tax income) and the actual income tax expense. The total amount of income tax savings equals the income tax refund plus the income tax savings ascribed to preferential income tax rate. Income tax savings rate (TAXSAV) is then calculated as the total amount of the income tax savings deflated by net income, which reflects the extent to which income tax preference contributes to boosting a firm's reported earnings. 9 Financial subsidy is derived from the account of "subsidy income" in a firm's income statement. The subsidy rate (SI), calculated as subsidy income divided by net income, is used to measure the extent to which a firm benefits from financial subsidies in achieving its earnings performance.
Multivariate regression analysis
The following pooled OLS regression model is conducted to test H1. 
The dependent variable, DA, is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industryspecific modified Jones model with IPO and SEO observations deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. 10 TFI is defined as the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and tax savings rate (TAXSAV), where SI equals subsidy income divided by net income for a firm over a fiscal year and TAXSAV equals 33% of pre-tax income minus income tax expense and plus tax refund, deflated by net income for a firm over a fiscal year.
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9 Observations are eliminated if net income is equal to zero or negative. 10 The deleted IPO and SEO observations include those that have IPOs or SEOs either at the current fiscal year or in the future two fiscal years. 11 In China, either a non-tax-deductible expense item or a tax-exempt income item generates book-tax difference for a firm. So, a firm needs to adjust its pre-tax income upwards by the non-tax-deductible expense and downwards by the tax-exempt income to obtain its taxable income number. However, on the one hand, expenses not necessarily incurred to generate revenue are treated by China's enterprise income tax law as a non-tax-deductible expense. In this sense, the non-tax-deductible expense should not constitute a source of income tax savings attributed to income tax preference. On the other hand, the tax exemptions for some income items, such as interest income from state-issued bonds, constitute a source of income tax savings attributed to income tax preference for a firm. Therefore, I use 33% of pre-tax income 17 I control for several firm characteristics that prior studies find to be related to the magnitude of earnings management. These firm characteristics include financial leverage (LEV) (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Klein, 2002) , firm size (SIZE) (e.g., Haw et al., 2004) , market-to-book ratio (MKT) (e.g., Young, 1999; McNichols, 2000; Kothari et al., 2005) , and capital intensity (EXP) (e.g., Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Young, 1999; Klein, 2002) , which are defined in the Appendix. I also control for year and region fixed effects, since the incentive schemes of fiscal support vary among local governments at the provincial level and differ across fiscal years (Chen & Lee, 2001 The estimated abnormal accruals for IPO and SEO firms contain abnormal accruals purely correlated with performance in addition to the accruals related to equity offerings. To alleviate the concern that the modified Jones model provides biased estimates of abnormal accruals when firms experience extreme earnings performance (Dechow et al., 1995) , I
further include two earnings performance-related variables, operating return on assets (ROA) and absolute value of change in operating return on assets (∆ROA), in the regression. These two control variables purge the earnings management measure of a firm's inherent accruals, reversal of lagged-year accruals, and growth in earnings, thus reducing measurement errors rather than 33% of taxable income as the benchmark to estimate TAXSAV. 12 Around 80% of the IPO and SEO firm-years in my sample do not have corporate governance information. Thus, controlling for corporate governance would have substantially reduced the power of the tests. 13 When robust standard errors clustered by industry are applied to correct for the industry effects, the firm effects are also addressed given that a firm's industry affiliation does not vary across periods. I do not include industry dummies in the regression to correct for the industry effects because, in the case of industry effect not fixed, the dummies would not fully capture the within-industry dependence, and hence the standard errors are still biased downwards (Petersen, 2009 Chinese equity offerings firms. Second, the superiority of the performance-matching approach in addressing biased estimates of abnormal accruals of a firm with extreme earnings performance lies in the assumption that, on average, treatment sample and matched firms have the same estimated non-event abnormal accruals and that, at the portfolio level, the impact of performance on accruals should be identical for the treatment and matched sample (Kothari et al., 2005) . Nonetheless, the homogeneity in the relation between accruals and performance for treatment firms and matched firms is not always warranted. Third, a recent study by Keung and Shih (2014) finds that the performance-matching approach systematically underestimates the abnormal accruals and that using the performance-matched abnormal accruals for regression analyses will bias the regression coefficients towards zero. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the main variables used for the hypothesis tests.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
The average abnormal accruals are significantly above zero; so are all the quartiles, including the median of abnormal accruals. This implies that equity issuers tend to manage reported earnings by altering discretionary accruals prior to the offerings, which is consistent with prior research. The mean subsidy rate is 4.6% with a standard deviation of 19.8%, indicating that an average of 4.6% of net income stems from financial subsidies from local governments.
The mean income tax savings rate reaches 17.1%. This suggests that income tax preference is generally more significant in upgrading a firm's earnings performance than financial subsidy.
The mean TFI amounts to 21.7%, suggesting that an average of 21.7% of net income of the sample firms is ascribed to fiscal support from local governments. In addition, it can be inferred from the quartiles that the income tax preference grant is more prevalent than the financial subsidy grant for equity issuers in China. Table 3 reports Pearson (Spearman)
correlations among the variables used in regression model (2). The correlation coefficients are all below 0.50, suggesting that no significant multicollinearity problem exists for model (2). The results are robust to winsorizing the observations with extreme variable values (1% at both tails) and to excluding the outliers from the sample using Cook's (1977) distance statistics. and on tax savings rate (TAXSAV) are both negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that firms are less likely to engage in earnings management if they enjoy more income tax savings attributed to preferential income tax treatments or enjoy more financial subsidies from local governments. The absolute value of the beta coefficient for tax savings rate (TAXSAV) is significantly larger than that for subsidy rate (SI) (F-stat. = 3.53), indicating that the attenuating impact of income tax preference on earnings management is stronger than that of financial subsidy. This is probably because preferential tax treatment is more of a stable and long-run economic incentive to a firm compared to a subsidy grant that varies across fiscal years, thus making the firm less motivated to manage earnings to window-dress its performance.
Regression results
Test of H1: The effect of fiscal support on earnings management
The differential effects of income tax preference and financial subsidy on earnings management
Corporate income tax preference takes the form of tax refunds and preferential income tax rate. To further probe the effect of preferential income tax rate on earnings management, I
deduct the tax refund from the total tax savings to construct the preferential income tax rate variable, with which I replace TAXSAV to re-run the regression. 14 The results (not tabulated)
suggest that preferential income tax rate alone significantly reduces earnings manipulation activities of a firm prior to its equity offerings.
Separate IPO firms from SEO firms for test of H1
Since the motivation for earnings management of IPO firms likely differs from that of SEO firms (Teoh et al., 1998a; Haw et al., 2005) , I partition my sample into IPO firm-years and SEO firm-years for the hypothesis test. When testing H1 using the SEO sub-sample, I
include the absolute difference between pre-subsidy ROE and regulatory ROE threshold (DistanceROE) to control for a firm's potential incentives for meeting the ROE threshold for rights offerings. Table 6 reports the regression results based on the partitioned samples. The coefficients on TFI, TAXSAV, and SI for both the IPO and SEO subsamples are all negative and statistically significant, which supports H1.
Robustness check
Alternative measure of income tax savings attributed to preferential tax treatment
To highlight the income tax savings reflected on current tax liabilities, I exclude deferred tax from income tax expense and employ an alternative measure of income tax savings as follows: 33%* [net income + (income tax expense -deferred income tax)] -(income tax expense -deferred income tax) + tax refund, namely, TAXSAV. I repeat my regression 14 Firms that have tax refunds only account for a very small percentage in my sample (46 out of 3290 firm-years). So it is hard to test the effect of tax refund on earnings management in this study.
analysis using TAXSAV. The results (available upon request) are similar in all respects to those reported in Table 5 .
Alternative measures of earnings management
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) 
Correct for endogeneity using 2SLS model
Thus far, I assume that fiscal support is exogenous to firm-level decisions and activities.
However, in the context of equity offerings during which local governments desire as much capital inflows to their jurisdictions as possible, their decisions on whether and how to subsidize SEO firms or IPO firms might vary across years depending on a firm's financial performance. If local governments tend to lend fiscal support to firms that have poor earnings performance, firms that wish to obtain fiscal support from local governments would lack incentives to manipulate earnings. Thus, reverse causality and self-selection issues arise in the way that a lesser extent of earnings management results in stronger fiscal support from local governments. Or rather, in the case that less earnings management is motivated by a firm's desire to obtain stronger fiscal support from local governments, we could also find a negative association between earnings management and fiscal support.
However, this endogeneity concern is likely minimal because my multivariate tests are based on a contemporaneous relation between fiscal support and earnings management. Note that fiscal support granted on any date during a fiscal year would be reported in a firm's financial statements for this fiscal year, which is captured by my fiscal support measure at the end of this fiscal year. After the fiscal year-end but before the earnings announcement date, managers can still artificially adjust accruals by changing the accounting estimates or methods, which can still be captured by the DA measure for this fiscal year-end (Zang, 2012) .
In this regard, firms can engage in earnings management (to adjust their current year's ROA) in response to the fiscal support they receive from local governments during the year. insignificant, which implies that the instruments (i.e., GDP and INDSUBSI) I construct are exogenous and uncorrelated with the error terms. The partial F-statistics are all well above the cutoff point of 11.59 and statistically significant at the 1% level-further support that the models are not subject to weak instrument problems (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010) . 15 In the first-stage estimation, INDSUBSI takes on a negative and significant coefficient, consistent with the notion that firms whose industrial financial performance in the region is strong would less likely be fiscally supported by their local 15 According to Stock et al. (2002) , when there are two instrumental variables in the first-stage regression, the F-statistic for the instruments needs to be above 11.59 to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak.
governments. A significantly positive coefficient on ROA implies that local governments tend to fiscally support firms that have a good earnings performance. As there is no evidence that local governments tend to lend fiscal support to poorly performing firms, I refute the self-selection possibility that lack of earnings management activities is driven by firms' desire for stronger fiscal support from local governments. The second-stage regression results show a significantly negative coefficient for the fitted TFI, SI, and TAXSAV, respectively. This further corroborates the conclusion that the regression results shown in Table 4 and 5 are free from the potential endogeneity bias.
In addition, it could be argued that firms' close relationship with the government induces a mechanical, negative association between fiscal support and earnings management. On the one hand, an IPO/SEO firm that has a closer relationship with its government is more likely to be fiscally supported. On the other hand, a better firm-government relationship might make a firm more likely to be successful in IPO or SEO, and consequently, the firm is less likely to manipulate earnings. In an effort to rule out this alternative explanation, I do the following analyses. First, I control for firm-government relationship in the first and second stage of the 2SLS model, and the results still persist. An indicator variable for whether a firm is a stateowned enterprise is used as the proxy for firm-government relationship, since state-owned enterprises tend to have a closer relationship with the government than do non-state-owned enterprises (e.g., Wu, 2009; Wang, Wong, & Xia, 2008) . Second, I conduct a falsification test.
Specifically, I run a moderated regression analysis by interacting the government relationship measure with the fiscal support variable for model (2). If the alternative explanation holds, the negative impact of fiscal support on earnings management would be more pronounced for firms that have a stronger relationship with the government. Nonetheless, I fail to find such evidence, as indicated by a statistically insignificant coefficient on the interaction term. These results are not surprising because the alternative explanation is premised on the assumption that good firm-government connection is negatively associated with earnings management.
Some prior studies (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007; Jian & Wong, 2010) , however, allude to the opposite, showing that government-controlled firms tend to engage in earnings management and tunneling activities.
Firm-fixed effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management
Though the pooled OLS estimation of equation (2) yields results consistent with H1, it cannot identify whether the impact of fiscal support comes from explaining variation in earnings management across firms (i.e., cross-sectional variation) or variation in earnings management within firms (i.e., time-series variation). The distinction between variation across firms and variation within firms is important because theoretical and conceptual arguments as regards how fiscal support is related to earnings management predict that (1) firms with high fiscal support are less likely to manage earnings than firms with low fiscal support, which is a cross-sectional prediction, (2) a firm that enjoys an increase in fiscal support is less likely to manipulate earnings, which is a time-series prediction. The firm-fixed effect model serves to distinguish these two types of variations (Wooldridge, 2000) .
To determine whether within-firm variation in fiscal support explains within-firm variation in earnings management, I estimate a firm-fixed effect model for equation (2).
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This research design removes most of the cross-sectional variation in fiscal support and relies primarily on the within-firm (i.e., time-series) variation in fiscal support. If the negative association between fiscal support and earnings management is driven mainly by crosssectional differences, then using the firm-fixed effect model, we expect to find no evidence of a relationship between fiscal support and earnings management. On the contrary, if withinfirm variation in fiscal support explains within-firm variation in earnings management, we expect to find an association between fiscal support and earnings management when including firm-fixed effects in the regression. Table 8 presents the results for the firm-fixed effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management. The relationship between financial subsidy and earnings management is insensitive to including firm-fixed effects. In particular, the coefficient for subsidy rate (SI) is negative and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that variation in financial subsidy explains not only the variation in earnings management across firms, but also the time-series variation in earnings management within a firm. However, the coefficient for tax savings rate (TAXSAV) is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the significant result for TAXSAV in Table 5 is primarily driven by the cross-sectional variation in preferential tax treatment, not by the time-series variation. This is not surprising because unlike the scheme of financial subsidy grant, which may vary substantially across fiscal years, income tax preference barely changes over time once granted to a firm by a local government. The lack of time-series variation in preferential tax treatment induces the statistically insignificant coefficient for TAXSAV estimated by the firm-fixed effects model. 
Conclusion
This study is the first to investigate whether fiscal support has an impact on earnings management of a firm. Fiscal support could substitute for a firm's earnings management in achieving desired earnings targets. Earnings management is costly and has negative economic consequences for a firm, whereas fiscal support adds up real cash benefits to a firm. Thus, given a firm's desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support reduces the firm's demand for 17 According to Wooldridge (2000) , an effective firm-fixed effect model requires that the independent variable display sufficient variation over time within a firm. From a technical point of view, this is because the time-invariant variable would be perfectly collinear with firm-fixed effect components. From an economic point of view, this is because the firm-fixed effect model is designed to study what causes the dependent variable to change within a given firm. A time-invariant independent variable cannot cause such a change.
earnings management. Accordingly, I hypothesize that the magnitude of earnings management is smaller for firms that enjoy stronger fiscal support from local governments.
The hypothesis is predicated on the premise that firms have an incentive to achieve certain earnings targets. Equity offerings in China induce such incentives not only for managers but also for a local government that aims to help its listed firms finance their investments. Thus, I focus on the equity offerings setting to test the hypothesis. The findings in this study imply that institutional factors in regard to fiscal support from local governments should be accounted for in earnings management research on China's capital market, in which fiscal support prevails and governmental influence on firms' financial reporting incentives dominates. As fiscal support is compared to a sort of government-assisted earnings management (Chen et al., 2008) , this study complements the recent stream of earnings management literature (e.g., Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015) , which shows that firms tend to use real and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes to achieve their desired earnings targets.
In addition, I find that preferential tax treatment mitigates earnings management to a larger extent than financial subsidy does. However, the Chinese Enterprise Income Tax Lastly, some caveats need to be noted for this paper. First, as with prior research (e.g., Wu & Zhang, 2009; Beatty, Liao, & Yu, 2013) , this study is subject to endogeneity attributed to potentially omitted variables. Despite efforts in addressing the endogeneity, I cannot completely eliminate it. Second, like some prior studies (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007; Jian & Wong, 2010) , I focus on Chinese firms that have successfully conducted IPO TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV), where SI is the subsidy rate, and TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. All the independent variables including TFI are defined in the Appendix. The year and region dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. All the independent variables including SI and TAXSAV are defined in the Appendix. The year and region dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Notes: This table presents regressions results for the tests of H1 for SEO firm-years and IPO firm-years, respectively. The dependent variable is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. SI is the subsidy rate. TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV). All the independent variables, including SI, TAXSAV, and TFI are defined in the Appendix. The year and region dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Notes: This table presents the results for the two-stage least squares regression with INDSUBSI and GDP used as the instruments. TFI, SI, and TAXSAV are instrumented respectively as the dependent variables in the first-stage regressions. The dependent variable in the second-stage regression is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. All the independent variables are defined in the Appendix. The year and region dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported for brevity. The t/z-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Notes: This table reports the results for the firm-fixed effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management. DA is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the crosssectional estimates of normal accruals. SI is the subsidy rate. TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV). All the independent variables, including SI, TAXSAV, and TFI are defined in the Appendix. The year dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported for simplicity. The region dummies and the constant term are automatically differenced-out by the firm-fixed effect estimates. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
